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Introduction 
• Welcome? 
• Points of Contact: 
- Mike Dook, OSMA - Tel: (202) 358-0226; mlchael.dook©nasa.gov  
- Cal Staubus, NASA KSC - Tel: (321) 867-8157; 
calverta..taubus@nasa.gov 
- Tom Palo, NASA KSC - Tel: 1321) 861-8726; 
thomas.epalo@nasa.gov 
- Shawn Donovan, SRS Technologies —Tel: (321) 867-6240; 
shawn.t.donovannasa.gov 
- Mary Becker, SRS Technologies - Tel: (321)867-3266: 
marvini.becker@nasa.gov 
- Program Wobalto: wwwkac.n..a.00vlolvoavinadsaf.tv  
MIss1on Success Starts With Safety 
Topics 
• Background 
- Current NASA ELV Payload Safety Review Process Standard 
- Issues Needed to be Addressed by New Program 
• New Program Development 
- Program Development Working Group 
- Program Development Executive Team 
- AccompllshmentslActivltlex 
- Tasking and Funding 
- Schedule 
• NPR 8715.3, Chapter 3, Payload Safety 
- NASA Payload Safety PolIcy 
- NASA ELy Payload Safety Program 
• Applin.bilfty 
• Rol.. and R..pon.lbiIlti..
-MlssIon Success Starts With Safety 
Topics (continued) 
Proposed NPR 871 5.XX, NASA ELV Payload Safety 
Program 
- Chapter 1, Program Overview 
- Chapter 2, Safety Review and Approval Process 
Mission Roles & Responsibilities 
Flow of Activities and Deliverables 
Website 
- Chapter 3, Requirements 
Design, Ground Operations, etc. 
Variance 
- Training Program 
Open Discussion 
-- -	
• MIssIon Success Starts With Safety 
Background 
• NASA STD-8719.8, "ELy Payload Safety 
Review Process Standard, dtd June 1998 
(scheduled for review June 2003) 
- Applies to Orbital and Deep Space ELV Missions 
(unmanned) 
- Focus on safety of processing at launch site, 
including payload processing facilities at or near 
launch site 
- Designed for missions involving numerous 
organizations and various vehicle/launch site 
combinations (derived from Shuttle PSRP/GSRP 
with appropriate differences)
: Mission Success Starts With Safety -, 
Background (continued) 
• NASA 510-8719.8 (continued) 
- Has been successful (with ad hoc changes) for a 
majority of NASA ELV payloads 
- Certain complications evolved after the Process 
was developed: 
- Complicated roles for projects involving multIple NASA 
Centers 
Projects Involving International Partners 
Lack of approval process for use of common spacecraft 
bus 
Lack of process for resolving dissentIng opinions within 
NASA and with external organizations 
- Lack of acceptance of external approving authority and 
requirements
1
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20130013001 2019-08-31T01:09:33+00:00Z
_______________________ - Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Ba,kgoo,t co,Olnoed) 
Cloud-Aerosol LIDAR and Infrared Pathfird- S'rI'o T)l-o' 	 -' 
(CALIPSO) Spacecraft 
Launched successfully from VAFB 
SLC2, April 2006 
(Example) Entailed many administrative 
and technical complications	 ,	 - 
Highlighted weaknesses in Current	 - 
payload safety process	 --- - 
- Goddard Science Program - Langley Project - KSC Launch Seruices 
- Co-manifested with CLOUDSAT - Led by Goddard 
- NASA provided CALIPSO instrument - France provided spacecraft bus 
• "Oft the shair' hydrauina-fcaicd Pruta00 spacecraft ma,rnfect,a'sd by Atcatel 
Span. indnatrlse and provided by the CenIra National d'Etades Spatial.. (CNE8) 
as ta "contribution" to the joint teisalon 
• Joint Mission Agreement - not your typical contract 
- Proteus flown successfully in 2001 on the Jason-I - led by JPL 
- Goddard SMA and Engineering raised concerns with Proteus: 
FactS tolerance for leakage of hydrsuine. softwa. safety, battery safety, othata 
Resolution via Formal Variance Process: 
• P.rsonnsi safety ensured eta implementation of NESC recommendatIons 
• Mission cacusas tisk accepted uia NASA Vaflanc.
"	 Miulon Success Starts With Safety 
Background (continued) 
- Current process requires a Payload Safety Working Group 
(PSWG) for each payload with representatives from all Involved 
organizations: 
PSWG membership by a Canterlorganization sometimes varies tot' 
the same mission, and from one mission to the next (even when a 
common, previously approved spacecraft bus is assessed) 
• Lack of communication between members within some 
organizations 
• Technicat concerns sometimes handled differently foe similar 
payloads (not necessarily a problem, but can be) 
- Relies heavily on other agencies' requirements (e.g,, Air Force) 
• Subject to other agencies' interpretation of requirements 
• Other agencies' safety focus perceived to vary when it is not their 
payload 
NASA's authority is sometimes mIsunderstood and decisions 
challenged when using other agencies' requirements documents 
itMj5slon Success Starts With Safety 
Background (continued) 
- Requires "Tailoring" of requirements for each payload 
• Subject to misunderstanding the process and benefits, and poor 
implementation 
• Current Process lacks the strict and consistent oversight from one 
project to the next needed for proper implementation 
- Relies heavily on the ability of the PSWG to reach consensus 
• Current process does not Identify a decision-making authority 
• No clear direction for when consensus cannot be reached 
• Resolution of contentious Issues can drag-on until the "finat hour' 
• No clear direction on the applicable Safety Variance Process
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Background (continued) 
Summary of issues to be addressed by an Agency ELV 
Payload Safety Program: 
- Complicated roles and responsibilities associated with 
multi-partner projects 
- Working relationships and communications between all 
organizations involved in the payload safety process 
- Consistent interpretation and implementation of safety 
requirements from one project to the next 
- Consistent implementation of the Tailoring Process 
- Clearly defined NASA decision-making-authority 
- Bring Agency-wide perspective to each ELV payload 
project 
-	
Mission Success Starts Wtth Safety 
Program Development 
Prog ram Develop ment Working Group 
• Established via Letter From Dr. Stamateiatos, March 24, 2004 
• Open to all NASA Centers and other appropriate organizations 
Current P005 
APL Clay Smith	 ARC	 aaaan StEfet 
GRC eiii Schonsn	 O8FC Karen Fisher 
HO	 Mike 000k, 5t.. VoIziSUD	 JPL	 Jim Ltanadan 
KSC Cal Staad,us, Torn Pete	 JSC	 D.an Moreland 
LaRC Jo..' Carebailo	 M5FC Clxi. CowerS 
WFF Gerald Morris, Torn Moaklo.	 308W MItt. MnCo.nb. 
458W Jeffrey Wethern 
• Provide technical expertise 
• Provide Center's/organization's perspective 
• identify needs of future projects 
• Participate in Program document development and other activities
- Mission Success Starts With Safety ' 
Program Development (continued) 
• Working Group Kickoff Meeting at KSC, May 22, 2004 
- Significant philosophical differences within the Group in areas 
such U: 
Tailoring of requirements 
interpretation of requirements 
Experiences working with Air Force and other Ranges 
- In general, members agree on need for NASA requirements and 
for improvements to the safety review and approval process 
- Perspectives Represented: 
Spacecraft Design 
Launch Operations 
Contractor 
Agency (appropriate project-to-project consistency)
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Program Development (continued) 
Executive Team (Eatabliahad via letter from Bryan O'Connor. March sore) 
GSFC	 Karen Fisher 
KSC	 Cal Staubus, Tom Palo 
JPL	 Jim Lumsden 
HG	 Mike Dook 
icororactor .wpo.l at GSFC end KOC by 558 T.chnologi.ni 
• Draft Program Process/Requirements (NPD/NPR) 
• Organize and facilitate Working Group activities 
• Resolve Working Group comments 
- Striving to build consensus on Program Elements 
- HG Chi.t, SMA flee final decision 
• Ensure Program is consistent with current Agency impiementation of 
Technical Authority 
• Coordinate with external organizations 
slrlve Ion • joist approval process with Air Force Rang. Solely
.	 MIssion Success Starts With Safety 
Program Development (continued) 
Activities/Accomplishments 
• Program Development Objectives and Concepts (Charter) 
- Helped to help resolve philosophical differences as a first step 
• Fact Finding/Program Development Meetings During 2005 @ 
HQ, KSC, Patrick AFB, Vandenberg AEB. JPL. WFF, and sc 
• Briefed SMA Directors, August 11.2005, on Objectives and the 
Program Concepts/Approach - Obtained OK to Proceed 
• Published new Payload Safety Policy, Roles, and 
Responsibilities, September 2006: 
- NPR 8715.3, General Safety Program Requirements (Chapter 3) 
includes Agency Safety Policy applicable to all types of payloads 
- Establishes NASA ELV Payload Safety Program 
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Program Development (continued) 
Approach 
• Build on the current PSWG approach and augment as 
needed to address lessons learned 
• New Agency Safety Program to Include: 
- Establish and maintain NASA ELV Payload Safety Policy, Roles 
and Responsibilities, and Associated Requirements 
Ensure consistent interpretation of safety requirements 
- Define and oversee impiementation of the safety review process 
- Provide payload projects with training, tools, and guidance 
- Identify Decision Making Authorities 
• Formal process for resolving difference. witfdn the P5WG5 
• Formal variance process 
- Enhance and formalize key partnerships (e.g., Air Force and other 
ranges, commercial iaunch service providers, etc.)
JM1$$lOn Success Starts With Safety ° 
Program Development (continued) 
Continuing Development/Implementation Led by KSC
- Drafting new ELV Payload Safety Program specific NPR 
Safety Review Process and Technical Requirements 
Coordinate with all CenterfWorlcing Group Representatives 
Review and Approval of NPR via NODIS 
- Develop MOA5 with 3Q0/45h SW for concurrence on NPR 
- Ensure NPR written Into contracts/agreements for ELV 
missions 
- Developing Website, Tools, Training 
- Implementation kick off activities with payload projects 
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Program Development (continued) 
Tasking and FY06 Funding by OSMA 
KSC: (8300k) Safety Review Process Development. Overall Program 
Management, Executive Team Lead 
- Maceg.r: ccl Stsulnce, Teefevicai Lead: Tom Palo, Contractor: 5RS 
- Developing: Toot, and Training Program for project management and 
personnel 
- Coordiceling with Range and other partner. 
- Program Webait.: ws'w.kac.rama.uuvletvpavloedeefetv 
• Repoaito.Y for applicable policy, reqidremelds, standards, end 
Procesa schedule, and checkliata for us. by payload projects 
• Status tracking of ELV payload project, 
• GSFC: (8300k) Technical Requirements Development, Executive Team 
Member: Karen Fisher 
• JPL: (8200k) Input to all Program Development Activities, Executive 
Team Member: Jim Lumfiden 
• GSFC: (8100k) ELV Payload Safety and Mission Success Conference
Mission Success Starts With Safety ' 
ELV Payload Safety Program Schedule 
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NASA Payload Safety Policy 
Published in Chapter 3 of NPR 8715.3, General Safety 
Program Requirements. September 2006 
Applies to all payloads controlled by NASA 
Distinguishes: 
Manned Space Flight Payloads: Payloads that fly on, or 
interface with a manned space launch vehicle, spacecraft, 
or entry vehicle 
- Unmanned Suborbital Payloads: Payloads that fly on an 
unmanned suborbital vehicle (e.g., sounding rocket, 
balloon, or experimental aeronautical vehicle) 
- Return-to-Earth Payloads: Payloads that will return to Earth 
for recovery or purposes other than disposal 
- ELV Payloads: Unmanned orbital and unmanned deep 
space payloads 
Establishes the NASA ELV Payload Safety Program
e
.,,Mi$glon Success Stat-ti WIth Safety 
NASA Payload Safety Policy (continued) 
NPR 8715.3 
3.13.4.1 Payload Safety Policy It Is NASA polIcy to safeguard people 
and resources llncluding flight hardware and facllltlesl from hazards 
associated with payloads controlled by NASA and hazards associated 
with payload-related Ground Support Equipment IGSE) by eliminating 
the hazards or reducing the risk associated with each hazard to an 
acceptable level. To accomplish this policy NASA shall: 
a. Eatablish and maintain techrical and prccsdorel safety reqotrenrent, 
applicable to the dasign, production, flight-area prccesaing and testing, 
vehicle integration, flIght, and plennd rsaousry of NAsA payloads. 
b. coordinsl. with U.5. or foreIgn sntltlea that participate In NASA payload 
proiects es needed to .nsixa conqdl.ncs wIth .11 safety r.qrtlrsn..nt. that 
apply to each payload. 
c. Incorporate all applicable safety reqrdremetas Into the overall 
reqtirements for each NASA payload, the contracts for any related 
procor.nwres. end any related cooperstin. or greet .gr..nrer*a. 
4. MaIntaIn en Independent payload safety reciew and approval pt-aces. 
d.algned to enewe that each NASA payload prolect property ln,pt.rnenta 
all applicable safety reqotrenrenta end to facllltete safety risk ntaneg.n.erd 
appropriate to each payload. 
MissIon Success Starts With Safety 
NASA ELV Payload Safety Program 
(As established in NPR 8715.3) 
ApDlicability 
• Applies to unmanned orbital and unmanned deep space 
payloads managed or launched by NASA whether developed 
by NASA or any contractor or independent agency in a joint 
venture with NASA 
- Doen not apply to payloads lied Interface with a canned launch 0.1401. Or 
spacecraft 
- Doea not apply to payload, that will fly on suborbItal launch vehIcle, 
• Applies to ELV payload contracts, design, fabrication, testing. 
vehicle integration, launch processing, launch, and planned 
recovery of ELV payloads: payload provided upper stages 
flown on ELVs; interface hardware that is flown as part of a 
payload: and GSE used to support payload related operations
, MIssIon Success Starts With Safety" 
NASA ELV Payload Safety Program (continued) 
NPR 8715.3 defines the Program in the context of 
key roles and responsibilities: 
- Chief OSMA 
- ELy Payload Safety Manager 
- Executive Team - Executive Team Lead 
- Center Directors 
- Center Safety and Mission Assurance Directors 
- Payload Project Managers 
- NASA Contract, Grant, Cooperative Agreement, or Other 
Agreement Officers 
Program roles and responsibilities will move to 
Chapter 1 of new Program specific NPR currently 
under development 
,	
Mlulon Success Starts With Safety" 
ELV Payload Safety Program Integration 
Headquarters 
MIssIon DIrectorate, 
ET1 __ ____ 
I	 '::::::: 
Sefcty ttectsw 
Mlslon Centers	 Proc.s.Partclp.nta
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NASA ELV Payload Safety Program (continued) 
The Chief. Safety and Mission Assurance: 
• Oversee and provide funding for administration of 
Program 
• Approve and promulgate Agency-level Program policy 
and requirements 
• Designate in writing and provide Input to the 
performance evaluation of the NASA ELV Payload Safety 
Manager 
• Designate In writing the members of the NASA ELV 
Payload Safety Executive Team 
• Act as the technical authority when an Agency-level 
decision is needed regarding the Interpretation or 
Implementation of NASA ELV payload safety 
requirements (proposed in new NPR)
J Mission Success Starts WIth Safety ' 
NASA ELV Payload Safety Program (continued) 
NASA ELV Payload Safety Manager: 
• Lead the NASA ELV Payload Safety Pro9ram and serve as the 
Agency focal point for all matters involving ELy payload 
safety.. 
• Develop and maintain Agencylevel safety policy and 
requirements 
• Develop and administer the safety review and approval 
process... 
• Provide payload projects with guidance on implementation of 
policy, requirements, and processes 
• Provide input and guidance ... for development of ... contracts. 
grants, and cooperative agreements 
• Report to the NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission 
Assurance 
• Element of the HQ SMA Audits. Reviews, and Assessments 
program
MIssion Success Starts With Safety m 
NASA ELV Payload Safety Program (continued) 
NASA ELV Payload Safety Manager lrorsinu.dl: 
• Open or further enhance communication with U.S. and foreign 
entities 
• Ensure that safety review activities and actions are 
coordinated ... as needed to resolve payload safety concerns 
and support approval for flight 
• Establish and maintain a payload safety training program... 
• Provide forum for technical interchange and lessons learned... 
• Track and implement lessons learned... 
• Develop/maintain a NASA ELV Payload Safety Website 
(proposed In new NPR) 
• Develop, track, document, and report metrics data on the 
success of the Safety Program... (proposed in new NPR) 
• Ensure appropriate agreements with AF Range Safety and
other external organizations... (proposed in new NPR) 
__. Mission Success Starts With Safety 
NASA ELV Payload Safety Program (continued) 
NASA ELV Payload Safety Executive Team: 
• Element of HQ Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
• Functions to provide Agency-wide perspective and
insight on ELV payload safety related activities 
- Members from appropriate NASA Centers designated by OSMA 
• Assess payload projects/PSWG activities to assure NPR 
requirements are consistently implemented throughout 
Agency 
• Assure early identification of payload safety concerns 
and any applicability to other NASA payloads 
• Report to the NASA HQ OSMA on ELV payload safety 
concerns... 
• Participate in the NASA Safety and Mission Success 
Review (or equivalent)
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NASA ELV Payload Safety Program (continued) 
NASA ELV Payload Safety Executive Team Icontlnuedl: 
• Assure consistent interpretation of safety requirements 
and support each payload project as needed to assure 
proper implementation 
• Approve alternative approaches to satisfying safety 
requirements 
• Issue Interim guidance ... on safety requirements, 
processes, and specific payload design concerns 
• Assess and concur on any variances 
• Ensure that Executive Team decisions are consistent with 
other involved organization that shares safety 
responsibility 
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
NASA ELV Payload Safety Program (continued) 
Executive Team Lead: Iproposed In new NPR) 
• Establish and document the activities and processes 
needed for the Executive Team to satisfy its 
responsibilities 
• Ensure coordination with all Executive Team members 
on all Executive Team decisions 
• Serve as the approving (signing) official for the Office of 
Safety and Mission Assurance for any variance to a 
requirement contained in the NPR
Mission Success Starts With Safety 30 
NASA ELV Payload Safety Program (continued) 
Center Director: lRmP• to, a P.yImd, P,00m&ng F.naey, n, Lmmhse.l 
• Establish Center-level processes and requirements to ensure 
Agency policy and requirements are satisfied for each ELV 
payload project that uses the Centers resources 
Support safety assessments of ELV payload activities and 
respond to all findings and recommendations, for which the 
Center is responsible 
• Ensure that Center personnel Involved in payload projects 
complete training offered by ELV Payload Safety Program 
• Ensure that Center support, including GSE and facilities used 
in processing, testing, vehicle integration, launch, and planned 
recovery of NASA ELV payloads comply with applicable NASA 
and Center technical and procedural requirements 
(proposed In new NPR(
CMission Success Starts With Safety 
NASA ELV Payload Safety Program (continued)
- Mission Success Starts With Safety 
NASA ELV Payload Safety Program (continued) 
Center S&MA Director: (proposed In new NPR) 
Ensure implementation of Agency policy and 
requirements for each ELV payload project that uses the 
Center's resources in coordination with the NASA ELV 
Payload Safety Manager 
Provide each payload project with safety engineering, 
safety analysis, and other safety expertise needed to 
ensure the project successfully completes the safety 
review and approval process 
• Ensure that processes exist and assessments are 
conducted to ensure compliance with this NPR and the 
safety of activities within the scope of their authority
ELV Pa yload Prolect Manager: 
Ensure that funding and other resources are allocated for 
payload projects to satisfy all aspects of the NASA EL y Payload 
Safety Program.. 
Ensure that the payload project's timeline provides for 
compliance with the established payload safety review and 
approval process 
• Establish and Implement any project-level processes and 
requirements needed to satisfy safety requirements and 
successfully complete the payload safety review and approval 
process 
• Ensure all personnel ... possess the necessary certification. 
training, judgment and abilities (proposed In new NPR) 
• Prepare and approve any variance to a safety requirement... (proposed In new NPR) 
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NASA ELV Payload Safety Program (continued) 
NASA Contract, Grant. Cooperative Agreement, or 
Other Agreement Officer: 
• Coordinate with the NASA ELV Payload Safety Manager 
and Payload Project Managers to ensure that all 
applicable safety and mission assurance requirements 
necessary for payload safety are incorporated into the 
contracts and agreement(s) governing each payload...
Mlulon Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 8715.xx 
ELV Payload Safety Program 
CHAPTER 1 Program Overview 
Payload Safety Policy (cenalatant with general poiicy In NPR 8715.3) 
Roles and ResponsIbIlItIes (wooed fron. NPR 8715.3 end updated) 
variance Process (conalet.nt with NPR 8715.3) 
CHAPTER 2 Safety Review and Approval Proces 
Payload Safety Working Group 
Roles and Responsibilities 
• Flow of Activities and Deliverables 
Content of Deliverables 
CHAPTER 3 Payload Design and Ground Operations Safety 
Requirements 
• General Payload Flight Hardware and GSE Safety Design 
Safety Critical Software 
Ground Operations 
• Payload Flight Hardware and GSE 
. Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 871 5.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Process 
Goals 
• Assure the appropriate representation and involvement 
of all organizations that support the mission. 
Identify and resolve any safety concerns as early as 
feasible during the project timeline. 
• Assure that the project obtains the fomial approval of all 
safety authorities for the mission (internal and external 
to the Agency).
C
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Proposed NPR 871 5.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and Responsibilities coowsedl 
Payload Safety Working Group (PSWG) 
NASA ELV payload missions involve various 
combinations of payload organizations, payload 
contractors, launch vehicles, payload processing sites, 
and launch sites 
• To address this situation, a key aspect of the safety 
review process Is the establishment of a PSWG for each 
payload. 
• PSWG and Its required activities are designed to ensure 
appropriate Involvement of all organizations that support 
the associated mission and share safety responsibilIty 
for the mission (internal and external to the Agency)
-
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Payload Safety Working Group Membership 
I LaimnhV.iwi. I	 I	 Al Few. CoNrNAtor I	 I	 45305W 
I	 5.Ssty I.sI 
I MI.SINAC.M.rI	 I Laweb awne.. Mission ______ DMslan(SA.Ol 
PSVVGr 
w/Chairperson 
L$P ___________________________ Systems. SsbI.st 
L84 
________ ________	
(MN..d.d) ____________ 
I GrovndOP5	 I 
I_,Ne 
50.: NASA L..nN SN. 5.1, .15AS t S0. 15.11 shah
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Proposed NPR 8715.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and ResponsibIlitIes l.s.so,s.a) 
Payload Project Manauer 
• Ensure that a Payload Organization Safety Engineer is 
appointed no later than the Confirmation Review or 90 days 
prIor to the PDR 
• Ensure that a PSWG is established and functions lAW the NPR 
• Coordinate with the Payload Organization Safety Engineer to 
establish the PSWG and include the following members as 
applicable to the mission: 
- NASA Payload Organization Safety Engineer 
- Payload contractor safety representative 
- NASA Launch Services Division Safety Engineer 
- Launch vehicle contractor safety engineer 
- Payload processing facility safety representative 
- tane safety organization representative(s) responsible for 
- NASA Laincti Srvics. Program Launch Site Integration Manager (invilea partiCipanr} 
MlssIon Success Starts Will. Safety 
Proposed NPR 8715.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and Responsibilities s.As..a) 
Payload Prolect Mana ger (cont.): 
• Ensure all project personnel involved in the review process are 
experienced and trained as needed 
• Ensure that the payload organization plans for and fully 
participates in all safety review and approval process activities 
• Concur on all safety review and approval process deliverables 
prior to submittal to the PSWG 
• Ensure that all approved safety plans and procedures are 
implemented 
• Notify the NASA ELV Payload Safety Manager of the new 
project and provide contact information for the appointed 
Payload Organization Safety Engineer 
• Ensure safety status and any safety concerns are presented at 
mission design reviews, Including the Preliminary Design 
Review and Critical Design Review
MissIon Success Starts With Safety ° 
Proposed NPR 8715.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and Responsibilities vov 
Payload Proiect Manager (cont.): 
Obtain all safety approvals needed to accomplish each 
mission which shall include: 
Approval(s) as appropriate to receive and process the 
payload at any NASA facility 
- Letter from the NASA ELV Payload Safety Manager 
indicating that the project has successful completed the 
payload safety process 
• Provide the PSWG with a Certificate of Safety Compliance, 
signed by the Payload Project Manager and to be signed by all 
PSWG members at the Phase Ill Safety Review 
• Brief the closure status of all items in the Safety Actions 
Tracking Log and any payload safety issues during the Flight 
Readiness Review 
.
'	 Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 871 5.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and ResponsibilitIes ,s.'As.sd) 
Executive Team: 
For each mission, Team shall designates member to serve as 
the Team's primary interface for the safety review and approval 
process 
Develop a mission specific assessment plan prior to the 
Payload Safety Introduction Meeting. 
Review all safety review submittals, participate in safety review 
activities as needed, and approve any alternative approaches 
for satisfying safety requirements 
Coordinate on guidance provided to a PSWG that has not been 
previously documented as an official ET position.
'	
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Proposed NPR 871 5.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and Responsibilities leesSss.A) 
Payload Organization Safety Engineer: 
• Perform as the payload organization's primary member of the 
• Ensure the preparation and submittal of all safety 
review/approval process deliverables 
• Ensure the implementation of all approved safety related plans 
and activities 
• Ensure that payload design process incorporates system safety 
engineering activities integral to identifying hazards, developing 
hazardous solutions, and ensuring compliance with this NPR 
• Keep the Payload Project Manager informed of mission safety 
status 
• Ensure that a Safety Verification Tracking Log is established and 
maintained for the project 
• Ensure that a Safety Action Tracking Log is established and 
maintained for the project 
T	 Mission Success Starts With Safety ° 
Proposed NPR 8715.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and Responsibilities 
Payload Organization Safety Engineer (cont.): 
• Ensure that released technical operating procedures are 
reviewed and approved by facility safety and other responsible 
organizations 
• Participate in Payload Design Reviews presenting 
mission safety status 
• Ensure that the PSWG and Executive Team are notified 
whenever a mishap or close call takes place involving 
their payload 
• Mishap reporting will be conducted in accordance with
contractual documentation and NPR 8621.1, NASA 
Procedural Requirements for Mishap and Close Call 
Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping
MIssion Success Starts With Safety" 
Proposed NPR 8715.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and ResponsibilIties Ioaw.5 
PSWG Members: 
• Participate in the safety reviewlapproval process 
• Assist the payload project to comply with applicable safety 
requirements 
• Within their scope of authority, assess for safety the payload 
design, fabrication, testing, integration, pre-launch and launch 
operations, planned recovery of the payload, and mission 
specific GSE, and interfaces with other supporting GSE, 
facility systems, and launch vehicle systems and GSE 
• Review and comment on all payload safety review deliverablea 
and meeting minutes 
• Assess and concur with any variance to a safety requirement 
within their scope of authority 
• Coordinate with the Executive Team and others as needed to 
resolve payload safety concerns 
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 871 5.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and Responsibilities vIn,,.a) 
PSWG Members (cont.): 
Coordinate with other PSWG members to identify a PSWG 
chairperson 
- Note: A member of the responsible NASA launch site 
safety organization typically serves as the PSWG Chairperson. Depending on the mission specifics, there 
maybe advantages to having a PSWG representative from 
one of the other NASA organizations involved in the 
mission perform this function. Example, for missions 
involving significant contributions from international 
partners, communications and coordination efforts may be 
more easily facilitated if the Payload Organization Safely 
Engineer performs as the PSWG Chairperson. A Co-
Chairperson may also be appointed if deemed necessary 
for any mission.
.Mlaslon Success Starts With Safety ° 
Proposed NPR 871 5.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and ResponsIbIlIties (,rv,,.a) 
PSWG Members (cont.): 
• Ensure that payload, facility, and payload/launch vehicle 
integration issues are disseminated to their organization 
and to other PSWG members 
• Participate in all PSWG meetings, mission safety 
reviews, design reviews, ground operations reviews, and 
other activities as requested by the PSWG Chairperson 
• Approve plans, hazard reports, and technical operating
procedures that fall under their safety responsibility 
• Sign the Certificate of Safety Compliance indicating 
safety approval for their area(s) of responsibility and 
provide in writing any constraints associated with their 
approval to be attached as an addendum to the 
Certificate at the Phase Ill Safety Review Meeting 
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 8715.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and Responsibilities o.vs,,.aI 
PSWG Chairperson: 
• Schedule and conduct PSWG meetings 
• Ensure that PSWG activities and decisions include the 
collective input and participation of all PSWG members 
• Ensure PSWG participation, as required, at payloadllaunch 
vehicle integration working group meetings (e.g. Ground 
Operations Working Group (GOWG), Mission Integration 
Working Group (MIWG)) 
• Facilitate the signing of the Certificate of Safety Compliance by 
appropriate PSWG members, compile any constraints, and 
ensure delivery to the ELV Payload Satety Program Manager 
• Ensure that all mission support and safety related documents 
are flied for access by the PSWG members, Executive Team 
and the NASA ELV Payload Safety Manager
Mission Success Starts With Safety" 
Proposed NPR 8715.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and ResponsIbIlities rw•p 
PSWG Chairperson (cont.): 
• Establish and maintain an integrated schedule of PSWG 
activities 
- Provide timely notification of any change to the 
schedule to all parties 
• Ensure all required safety review deliverables are 
distributed to PSWG members and all appropriate safety 
review officials via The ELV Payload Safety Website 
• Ensure that the Executive Team Is invited to all PSWG 
activities and Is on distributIon for all project 
deliverables 
• Coordinate and consolidate all comments to safety 
review submittals 
• Ensure PSWG activities are documented
8
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Proposed NPR 871 5.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and Responsibilities i,os,, C
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 871 5.xx, Chapter 2 
Safety Review and Approval Roles and Responsibilities 'sznsea, 
NASA Launch Services Pro g ram Manager: 
• Notify the PSWG of Ground Operations Working Group 
and Ground Operations Review activities 
• Ensure that the NASA Launch Services Division Safety 
Representative is notified of any payload/launch vehicle 
interface concerns 
• Ensure launch vehicle and commercial payload 
processing facility contracts provide the provisions of 
the NPR
NASA ELV Payload Safety Manager: 
• Track the status of each payload project as it proceeds 
through the safety review/approval process and provide 
guidance on the associated activities, tools, and 
deliverables as needed 
• Issue a letter indicating that the project has successfully 
completed the payload safety process 
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 871 5.xx, Chapter 2.4 
Flow of Activities and Deliverables 
Chapter 2.4 Overview 
Identifies the required safety documentation, Safety 
reviews, and sequence of submittal of the 
associated deliverables 
NPR 8715.xx will define more specifically: 
Topics to be covered in required safety briefings 
Support materials for briefings 
Submittal dates for safety documentation
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 8715.xx, Chapter 2.4 
Flow of Activities and Deliverables 
Goals 
• Safety review and approval activities to continue to coincide with the 
project management reviews required by NPR 7120.5. 
• Ensure appropriate emphasis on early safety activities 
• Satisfy AF Range Safety, NASA. and others requirements 
• Firm-up data delivery dates and specify In the NPR 
• Maintain, but enhance NASA STD 8719.8 structure and process 
Assumptions 
Payload Organization Safety Engineer is responsible for ensuring 
data deliverable preparation 
Activities identified in NPR 8715.xx are not au Inciusive of the 
required project, HO, or Center SMA documentation or reviews 
Mlssion Success Starts With Safety 
Draft NPR 8715.xx, Chapter 2.4 
Flow of Activities and Deliverables 
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	 Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Tailored Safety Requirements 
Tailored Safety Requirements result from the 
process of reviewing requirements to ensure 
applicability and compiiance by the project, as 
written, or whether the project will achieve an 
equivalent level of safety through an acceptable 
alternative requirement. 
• Joint activity by all PSWG members 
• Identifies applicable requirements 
- NASA. Range 8.f.ty, other Gon.r,nnent and coreemase standards 
• Documents the interpretation of requirements or applicability of a 
requirement to a specific mission activity 
• implements lessons-learned as applicable 
• Consolidates interim poiicy/guidancelrequirements 
• Documents the rationale for addltlonldeletion/change in requirements 
• Resulting Tailored Requirements are a safety requirements fore 
specific mission
9
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Tailored Safety Requirements (cont'd) 
The Tailoring process aids in identifying potential 
non-compliances and safety issues 
• Interpretation or compliance assessment performed 
early 
• Alternative approaches that provide an equivalent level 
of safety determined and finalized 
• Early resolution of issues reduces risk, enhance safety, 
and minimizes impact to project 
NPR 8715.xx will define the format for the tailored 
requirements, approval process, and provide by 
Attachment a baseline of tailored requirements.
MIssIon Success Starts WIth Safety 
Payload Safety Introduction Briefing 
Payload Safety Introduction (PSI) Briefing is the 
IntroductiOn of the mission by the project, with 
emphasis on safety aspects and Issues 
• First formal meeting with the PSWG and Executive Team 
• includes briefing of preliminary hazard analyses, Hazard 
Reports, Systems Safety Program Plan, and review of Draft 
Tailoring 
NPR 8715.xx will expand the typical agenda to include 
project lifecycle safety issues and the time period 
for the PSI to occur. 
Success Starts With Safety 
Payload Safety Introduction Briefing (cont'd) 
Topics include: 
- Applicable compliance documents (flew) 
- Contractual requirements and relationships (flew) 
- Systems Safety Program Plan 
- Description of payload, instruments, GSE, operations 
- Presentation of preliminary Hazard Reports (new) 
- Spacecraft failure modes/probability during ground 
operations 
- Discussion of potential non-compliances 
- Description of Planned studies and analyses 
- Description of flight path and launch vehicle options
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Payload Safety Introduction Briefing (cont'd) 
Topics include (cont'd): 
- Description of processing flow, schedules, milestones 
- Identification of facility requirements 
- Description of launch vehicle interfaces and mission 
unique GSE and operations at the launch pad 
- Contingency Operations (flew) 
-. Planned recovery activities (new) 
- Pre-launch mishap response and reporting (new) 
- Draft Tailored Requirements with critical assumptions 
- Recommendations for future TIMs, working groups, 
studies, etc. 
Mission Success Starts With Safety '° 
Systems Safety Program Plan (SSPP) 
Systems Safety Program Plan is a comprehensive 
description of how project safety activities will be 
executed to meet safety requirements. 
Systems Safety Program OrganizatIon 
Role, responsibilIty, and qualification of key safety 
personnel 
• Review and approval authority 
- Interfaces with other disciplines 
Lines of communication with management
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Systems Safety Program Plan (cont.) 
System Safety Program Milestones 
Safety tasks and activities in relation to mission milestones. 
Systems Safety Data 
- Deiiverabies!non-deliverables 
Systems Safety Integration 
Identifies interfaces with other external organIzations and 
safety authorities 
NPR 8715.xx will require increased emphasis on 
defining how safety activities are integrated 
throughout the project lifecycle.
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Mission Success Starts With Safety °' 
Hazard Reports 
Hazard Reports identify the potential hazards of a 
system, and define the causes, controls and 
verifications and assessment of risk 
- Report required for each unique hazard 
- Drafts required at PSI based on payload conceptual design 
and planned operations (new) 
- Reports address each operational phase and/or facility 
(new)
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Design Review Presentation 
Safety activities and issues are presented at 
the CDR & PDR by the Payload Organization 
Safety Engineer 
• Summary of safety activities and reviews, with dates 
and overview of upcoming safety milestones 
• Summary of hazard reports and hazard resolutions 
• Overview of non-compliances and potential safety issues 
Risk matrix chart (new)
Mlsslon Success Starts With Safety 
Safety Data Package (SDP) 
Safety Data Package is a data submittal that 
provides a detailed description of hazardous and 
safety critical flight hardware equipment, systems, 
components and materials that comprise the 
payload. 
• includes hazard reports, safety assessments, Inhibits, and 
mitigations 
• Together with the Ground Operations Plan, ills one of the 
media through which prelaunch safety approval is obtained. 
NPR 8715.xx clarifies the required submittals/dates for SDPs, and 
identifies by Attachment the required data to be submitted for 
each Phase. 
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Safety Data Package (cont'd) 
Safety Data Package (SDP) Phase Distinctions 
• Phase I (Preliminary) SDP - provides subsystem and box level 
data 
Phase II (Draft) SDP - update of Phase I; provides component 
and piece part level data 
updated Phase II (Draft) SDP - update of Phase II, reflecting 
post-CDR data, and disposition of comments to Phase I & II 
SDPs (new) 
• Phase III (Final) SOP - a SDP that incorporates all previous 
comments and reflects the as-built spacecraft configuration 
(i.e.. an on-the—shelf copy)
C
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Ground Operations Plan 
Ground Operations Plan (GOP) provides a 
detailed description of hazardous and safety critical 
operations for processing a payload and its 
associated ground support equipment. 
• Includes analysis of project-supplied GS, description of 
planned operations, Operating and Support Hazard Analysis, 
procedure descriptions and task summaries, and contingency, 
training, and emergency response plans 
• Together with the Phase Ill Safety Data Package, it is one of the
media through which prelaunch safety approval Is obtained.
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Ground Operations Plan (cont.) 
If operations occur at a NASA facility, or facility where NASA 
personnel controls the operation, or are required to perform a 
task during an operation, applicable portions of the GOP and 
hazard reports are to be approved NLT 30 days prior to 
hardware arrival. (new) 
NPR 871 5.xx expands the scope of ground operations 
requirements to include all NASA processing 
locations; GOP is also identified as the mechanism 
for submitting GSE and operations data to provide 
for earlier (than SDP) approval requirements. 
Issue: AFSPCMan 91-710 requires GOPs to be 
submitted 45 days prior to design reviews; NPR 
871 5xx proposes 30 days.
4 Mission Success Starts WIth safety 
Phase Ill Payload Safety Review Presentation 
Phase Ill Payload Safety Review is a review of safety 
activities and Issues, and Is presented by the Payload 
Organization Safety Engineer (new) 
• Presented to PSWG and ExecutIve Team prIor to pre-ahip review 
• Summary of safety activIties and reviews, and status of any In-
process safety related work 
• Overview of non-compliances and risks 
• Provides a verification that all safety requIrements and actIvities have 
been met, or review of plan to bring project Into compliance 
• Statuts of SVTL Items 
• certificate of ELV Payload Safety Compliance is signed (new) 
MissIon Success Starts With Safety 
Safety Verification Tracking Log (cont'd) 
MissIon Success Starts With Safety 
Safety Verification Tracking Log (SVTL) 
Safety Verification Tracking Log identifies the 
required verifications from the Hazard Reports that 
are constraints to payload activities and operations. 
• Required to be developed from hazard reports 
• Updated as required if open verifications exist that are 
constraints to payload processing 
• After payload arrival at the launch site processing 
facility, updated at least weekly 
• Reviewed at the Phase Ill Final Safety Review (new) 
C
ç MIssIon Success Starts With Safety ' 
Technical Operating Procedures 
Technical Operating Procedures provide a step-by-step 
description of the manner in which hazardous! safety 
critical operations will be accomplished. Procedure 
approval Is required prior to the start of a hazardous! 
safety critical operation. 
• All procedures are Identified in the GOP, providing substantIation of 
classIfication, task summaries, and O&SHA 
• Released hazardous procedures are to be submitted to safety 
approving authorities (for KSC. 55 days before use; 10 days on-the-
shelf) 
NPR 8715.xx wIll define the technIcal operating procedure requirements 
for submIttal, content, format. etc. that are currently In place
- Mission Success Starts With Safety " 
Website Demonstration 
J i•v PAYLOAD ShIFTY !R!GRM
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Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Website Discussion 
Safety Data Package Management 
Options 
o Program Office as part of normal data managemant/config 
2. LSP via their KSC website: https:llelvoroqram.kac.nasa.Qov 
3 Agency EL V Payload Safety Office via this website: 
http:llwww.ksc.nas.apvlelvoayloadsafetv 
. PBMA website: httc:Ilobma.nasa.gov 
- issueslConcerns 
• Need to select and develop process 
• Aosured access for all "partners" 
• Website support/cost - government vs contractor 
• In place or development required 
•	 Reliability 
• Customer Friendly
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Website Discussion 
Agency ELV Payload Safety Office Website Will Keep: 
- Safety Data Package Archives 
- Payload ES&H Lessons Learned 
- Variances 
- Forms/templates
ncM4sslon Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 3 
Design and Ground Operations Requirements 
Development: 
• Consistent with the general system safety policy of 
NPR 8715.3 
• Capture NASA and Air Force requirements as 
tailored for NASA ELV missions 
• Obtain Air Force by-in on the use of these 
requirements for launches at the Eastern and 
Western Ranges
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Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 3 
Flight Hardware and GSE Safety Design 
Goal Consistent interpretation and implementation of 
design requirements Agency-wide 
Approach: 
Provide clear requirements, associated definitions, and 
guidance, including examples applicable to NASA ELV 
payload projects 
Address: 
- Hardware Design Inhibits/Failure Tolerance 
- Design for Minimum Risk 
- Design for High Reliability
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 3 
Flight Hardware and GSE Safety Design (continued) 
Hardware Design Inhibits/Failure Tolerance 
The hardware design of each payload system (including 
fight hardware and associated GSE) that controls a 
hazard shall Incorporate a minimum number of design 
Inhibits against each credible hazardous system failure 
(EXCEPTION: Design tOo High Reliability) 
- A hazardous system failure Is a failure of the overall system, 
subsystem, or component that can result in Inlury to people or loss of resources, Including damage to flight hardware or 
facilities 
- A hazardous system failure is credible If it can occur and Is 
reasonably likely to occur. A quantitative guideline Is a 
probability of occurrence I 10-' 
- Failures of components that meet specific Design for Minimum 
Risk requirements are not Considered credible 
Mission Success Starts With Safety ° 
Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 3 
Flight Hardware and GSE Safety Design (continued) 
Required Minimum Number of Design Inhibits: 
• Dependent on the potential consequence(s) associated 
with each credible hazardous system failure 
• The design of a system that controls a hazard shall 
incorporate no less than: 
- Three design inhibits (dual failure toierant) against each 
credible system failure that can lead to loss of life 
- Two design inhibits (single failure tolerant) against each 
credible system failure that can lead to injury of people or 
loss of resources, but not loss of life
-	
Mission Success Starts With safety 
Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 3 
Flight Hardware and GSE Safety Design (continued) 
Determination of Credible Hazardous System Failures: 
• Coordinated effort between payload organization and the 
PSWG 
• Account for potential failure of all system components 
that do not meet specific Design for Minimum Risk 
requirements 
• Without consideration of any procedural hazard controls 
• If dependent on quantitative probabilistic analysis: 
- Formal written probabilistic risk assessment 
- incorporate system and component reliability data 
- Account for uncertainty in input data and any models 
- Subjected to peer review and approval 
Mlssion Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 3 
Flight Hardware and GSE Safety Design (continued) 
Determination of Req uired Number of Design inhibits 
for each Credible Hazardous System Failure: 
• Coordinated effort between payload organization and the 
PSwG 
• Account for both Immediate and long term potential injury or 
illness effects associated with each hazard 
• If based on an assessment that the hazard level will not exceed 
an injury/fatality threshold: 
- ForTnai written technical analysis 
Demonstrate that the hazard level will not exceed the 
injury/fatality threshold 
- Subject to peer review and approval 
• Design inhIbits shall consIst of electrical and/or mechanIcal hardware 
end be independent of any other inhibIt or hazard control
' Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 3 
Flight Hardware and GSE Safety Design (continued) 
DeSIg n inhibite: 
• Shall consist of electrical and/or mechanical hardware 
- An operator control is not Considered a design inhibit 
- Implementation of operator controls may be used as justification 
for a variance to the requirements for design Inhibits 
• Each design Inhibit shall be independent of any Other inhibitor 
hazard control 
• Design inhibits that protect against a specific hazardous system 
failure shall have design and/or Implementation differences between 
them to protect against a common cause failure of the inhibits 
• Each design Inhibit shall be verifiable after installation or through a 
process of pie-Installation testing and Implementation of written 
procedures that ensure the inhibit's integrity during and after 
installation 
• The system design shall allow for the system to be brought to a safe 
state in the event of the loss of a design inhibit.
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Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 3 
Flight Hardware and GSE Safety Design (continued) 
Design for Minimum Risk 
Components may be eliminated from consideration as a 
potential source of a credible hazardous system failure 
by complying with requirements that have been 
developed specifically for each such component 
- For example: structures, pressure vessels, pressurized 
line and fittings, and functional pyrotechnical devices. 
• Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Appendixes 0 and E Identify 
specific components and provided the associated 
Design for Minimum Risk requirements 
• Any proposed use of Design for Minimum Risk for a 
component not specifically addressed in Appendix D or 
E, requires approval by the NASA ELV Payload Safety 
Executive Team in coordination with any other 
responsible technical authority
MIssion Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 871 5.XX, Chapter 3 
Flight Hardware and GSE Safety Design (continued) 
Design for Hig h Reliability: (consistent with NPR 8715.3) 
A System may be exempted from the requirements for 
design inhibits if the system has high reliability that is 
verified by a formal reliability analysis: 
- Using accepted data in which uncertainties are Incorporated 
- Subject to the requirements of NPR 8705.5, Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) Procedures for NASA Programs and 
Projects 
- Regarding ELV payload, high reliability is defined as 0.999 
with 95% confidence (not specified In NPR 8715.3) 
Approach might not be acceptable to all safety authoritIes 
Involved in a NASA ELV payload mission 
- Approval to use this approach must be obtained from all 
PSWG members as early as possible in the project timeline 
Mission Success Starts With Safety ' 
Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 3 
Flight Hardware and GSE Safety Design (continued) 
Safety Critical Software: 
• Payload systems that incorporate safety critical software 
that are used to support NASA missions shall have an 
independent verification and validation plan in accordance 
with NPD 8730.4, Software Independent Verification and 
Validation (IV&V) Policy 
• NASA safety-critical software shall be developed in 
accordance with NPR 7150.2, NASA Software Engineering 
Requirements, and NASA STD 8719.13, Software Safety
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 871 5.XX, Appendixes 
APPENDIX A. Definitions 
APPENDIX B. Acronyms 
• APPENDIX C. Safety Variance Form and Instructions 
• APPENDIX D. Ground Operations Safety Requirements 
• APPENDIX E. Payload Flight Hardware and GSE Safety 
Requirements 
• APPENDIX F. Safety Verification Tracking Log 
- APPENDIX G. Safety Action Tracking Log 
• APPENDIX H. Payload Safety Introduction Meeting 
Topics 
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 3 
Flight Hardware and GSE Safety Design (continued) 
Ground Operations: 
Safety requirements applicable to ground operations 
associated with flight-area processing (including testing 
and vehicle integration) and any planned recovery of 
payloads provided in NPR 8715.XX, Appendix D (In work) 
Adaptation of Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710, 
Range Safety User Requirements Manual, Volume 6—
Ground and Launch Personnel, Equipment, Systems, 
and Material Operations Safety Requirements and using 
various NASA S&MA and industry documents 
Requirements tailored for NASA ELV payload projects 
and augmented with implementation guidance NASA 
projects
C
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 3 
Flight Hardware and GSE Safety Design (continued) 
Ground Operations (Appendix D) will address: 
- Personal Safety 
- Personnel Training 
-. Facility Inspection 
- Hazardous Operations 
- Hazardous Atmospheres 
- Physical/mechanical Hazards 
- Hazardous & Toxic Materials 
- Hazardous Temperatures & Cryogenics 
- Radiation (Ionizing and Nonlonizing) 
- Lasers
15
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Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 3 
Flight Hardware and GSE Safety Design (continued) 
Ground Operations (Appendix 0) (cont.) 
- Material Handling Operations 
- Acoustic Hazards 
- Pressurized Systems & Vacuum Systems 
- Ordnance 
- Electrical System Operations 
• Grounding 
• Bonding 
• Battery Operations 
• Energized systems 
- Launch Operations
Mission Success Starts With Safety ° 
NPR 8715.xx Technical Safety Requirement - 
Development Approach 
Goals 
Develop a NASA ELV payload safety document 
• Capture NASA requirements, interpretations, processea

Include NASA'. rot. in evaluating and data approval 
• Increase commonality among NASA Centers and with Ranges 
• Ranges' acceptance of tailored requirements in lieu of AFSPCMAN 
91-710 
Approach 
Use AFSPCMAN 91-710 an baseline document 
Strong heritage end comprehensin. 
co.nplianc. required for processing and launch 
Tailored AFSPCMAN 91-110 becomes Appendix E of NPR 8715.XX 
,	 Mission Success Starts With Safety ° 
Safety Requirements Flow 
Roqufltn.nia	 NASA Program Payload Project 
Source	 Document Safely Requhsmentu 
NPR 9715.00	 macrut .._NPR8TIS.ou aa
[i Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Tailoring Approach Details 
Maintain 91-710 chapter layout and paragraph nmasbetlng, to .otant possible 
Tailoring focuses onappilcabie payload requirements end credible 
contingencies 
- Cepturs NASA requirements and interpretations 
- Resolve longstanding issues 
Continue to utilize 'tact box..' to propose dasign solutions 
- Use to identify NASA best practices 
Use applicable doctenenca sparingly sea method to Identity specific 
requirements 
• Maintain 'stand alone' document philosophy for ease In mission spsci5u 
tailoring 
Raferenceiappiicabte documonta identified for informatiocel purposes 
Change the unilaloral Rango-required approval of specific requirements to 
include all safely approving authoritiaelPswo 
Add NASA Reqdrarnent Idantiflor after each specific requirement 
Tailor Attachment Ito provide references to data nmatricea 
$. MissIon Success Starts With Safety 
Tailoring - Example 
12.1.3.3. If the flange Ucor and Rango Safety approving 
safety authorities decide that depressunzing and/or 
offloading the pressure systems of a mated spacecraft is 
prohibited at the launch pad, spacecraft pifloed 
dematin g procedures shall be approved by-Rxyo Sofrety 
prior to use.(Reguirement) 
Rationale: Clarify requirement, as an approving authority 
would also be the NASA Launch Services Division Safely 
Office. Replace 'offload' with dematingc as offload procedures 
are required to be approved prior to spacecraft mating; 
contingency demating procedures may have to be tailored to 
address the circumstances of the contingency.
9disslon Success Starts With Safety 
Tailoring - Example (cont'd) 
12.1.3. Flight Hardware Pressure System Offloading 
12.1,3.1. For contingency eafing operations, hazardous pressure oyatemo 
shall be designed so that depressurizetion and drain fittings are accessible 
and donut create n personnel or equipment hazard for otftc.ding I.... 
ibid.. _l ttc. Lm.. etc onenpiec c00900dltles. iftaqulrsnssnt) 
Rationale: The co,nmnodlty fob. offloaded could be non-haza,douu. or not a 
fh,id; applicability at fit, launch co.nplez mao deleted, aa capability to offfoad 
Ia also requhsd at fit. payload procesaing facility. 
12.1.3.2. b.Jl0.,	 LL L hL I.. Propulsion ayalem design shall 
parted the offload of thaa..preaeurs syststns at any point eftar pressurization 
or loading, including the ability to offload all systems at the launch pad wIthout 
d.nsating of the spacecraft from the launch vehicle or any other disassembly 
of vehicle systems. (Requirement) 
Rationale: fl.caus. of the hazard polenliel, the ability to offtead lea 
mqub.tnenf, note design goal.
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Tailoring Example - Text Box (cont'd)	 Linking Tailoring to Data Requirements 
Sysiem design and contingency planning shall permit for safe 
movement of the payload to a payload processing facility. Planning 
hail address the worsi-case scenario. 
AccessIbility through payload fairing door(s) is the desired approach. 
vermcation/vaIlaation of the desi gn for accessibility is best achieved 
through a high fidelity model, mock-up of hardware, GSE. tooling. PPE. 
etc or by demonstrating sImilarity to accepted design and processes. 
Coordination with the launch vehicle contractor is necessar y for 
allowable pa yload faking door size and placement operational suoorxt 
and ability to perform contingency support in hazardous andlor 
explosive environments. 
Rationale: Design solution added to ensure early coordination end 
planning for access to hardware in the event of a leak contingency. 
-	 Mission Success Starts With Safety	 - Mission Success Starts With 
Linking Tailoring to Data Matrices 	 Safety Data Matrix - EGSE Example 
I.. 
.liIIIIIL-' 111111 111111 
•11111 
-J Mission Success Starts With Safety000 
Safety Data Matrix - Inhibit Status Summary
1. :zi izjiJ ii' I.1LZZ 
-U 
-.
___________ 
-U
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Safety Data Matrix - Pyro and NEI Devices 
IZ00VttiT 1:Tmvrnmrl,n'nr	 .	 -,-	 0	 -
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Safety Data Submittals 
Impact of Late Deliverables 
- increases the potential of a safety issue requiring 
resolution late In safety review process 
- Mission may not be able to implement an optimum solution 
to resolve (engineering, science and safety impact) 
- Resulting risk may be unacceptable or higher than desired 
- Impacts the safety review process 
- Cost and schedule impacts trickle-down throughout project 
and support 
- Noncompliance to Range Safety Requirements
-	 MIssion Success Starts With 
Impact to Safety and Risk 
• Safety requirements may not be implemented (fully) 
if discovered late, or after critical milestones In the 
design phase 
• Required design changes may be constrained 
- Engineering capability or feasibility 
- Cost 
- Scheduie 
- Mission goals 
• Effectiveness (if instituted) of engineering solutions 
- Safety tradeoffs may resuit 
- integrated hazards 
-	 'Mission Success Starts With Safetyou 
Impact to Safety and Risk (cont'd) 
• Additional hazard mitigations may result 
Necessary inhibits and monitoring capability may not be 
optimal due to technical limitations 
- Additional cost may be incurred to implement 
- Impact to schedule; support requirements 
New or revised of procedures may be required 
- Implementation may still result in level of risk 
Potential increase in risk 
- Compromise to spacecraft and launch vehicle safety, 
systems, facilities, and GSE 
- Risk to processing and pad personnel; public safety 
- Risk to mission success
-4 Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Impact to Safety Review Process 
• Late submittal reduces allocated safety review time 
- Increases the potential of omission/Oversight 
- Cause further delays if additional data/clarification is 
needed 
• Systems, safety and mitigation changes add to the 
review process 
- Additional analysis/test/reports required 
- Ensure adequate mitigation 
- Demonstrate an equivalent level of safety 
-	
-	
j, MlssionSuccessStartsWlthSafety° 
Impact to Safety Review Process 
• Disrupts the planned work schedule of reviewers 
- May infringe on data review required for other missions 
• Potentially could result in submittal of a Mission 
Risk, with associated briefings, documentation, and 
tracking 
• Affects the release of other mission documents 
(e.g., Interface Control Document, Launch Site 
Support Plan) 
- Safety inputs are required 
- impacts the OPR's scheduie for document development
j, Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Impact to Safety Requirements 
Noncompliance to NPR 
- NASA policy requires a variance to be submItted 
Missed delivery milestone 
Potential for an additional non-compliance to a technical 
requirement 
impact to payload pro)ect (associated cost and schedule) for 
variance preparation, briefings, coordination 
- Cost and time for variance review/approval by OSMA, ELV 
Payload Safety Program, Center Director(s), PSWG, Range, etc. 
- Terms of acceptance may Include addItIonal mItigations, 
process/procedural changes, or non-concur 
Noncompliance to other requirements (e.g, Range, 
OSHA)
18
CMission Success Starts With Safetyw 
Impact to Launch Vehicle Contractor 
Spacecraft safety data package is needed for preparation 
of the launch vehicle mission-specific safety data 
package 
- Contract deliverable requirement 
• May require unanticipated support requirements, or 
modifications to vehicle I pad activities 
- Mission-specific GSE requirements 
Procedural changes for pad operations 
• Changes to established procedureslprocesses or need 
for out-of-sequence work Increases risk 
- Schedule changes 
Support availability
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Corrective Action - Goals 
• Ensure that safety and ELV Payload Safety Program 
objectives are achieved 
- Safety is adequately performed In a timely and efficient manner 
consistent for au missions 
- Mission objectives are met 
• Minimize cost and schedule impacts 
• Ensure requirements and associated corrective 
actions are defined and implemented consistently 
• Required actions are value-added 
- Provide an equivalent means to ensure safety is appropriately in-
step with mission activities, not a paperwork exercise 
-Mlsslon Success Starts With Safety 
Corrective Action - Options 
Potential options to achieve safety confidence and manage risk 
increase in severity: 
- 'Get-well' schedules from Project Management for milestones / 
deliverables 
- Risk process/ watch item used to monitor status and resolution 
- Variance (Level i) 
- Formal project assumption of risk / cost I schedule impact due to 
potential safety-driven changes 
Delta safety reviews 
- System Engineering briefings to provide data 
- Additional interim safety data submittals 
- Variance (Level II) 
- Audits of Engineering Data 
- Project Milestone Reviews (PDR, COR, FRR, LRR, etc.) are kept 
'OPEN' to completion 
Goal is to prevent a delay in payload shipping, processing, 
transportation to the pad, or launch
-c Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Implementation Methods 
Project action required is documented in the ELV Payload Safety 
Program NPR 
- Assessment of factors would determine required action(s) 
Example #1: Late submittal of Safety Data Package 
Considerations: 
Extent of delinquency; frequency 
Project phase or miiestone (e.g., POR vs. CDR) 
Criticality and probability of late safety findings 
impacting project milestones 
Remedial steps required: Safety Assurance through 'back 
up' means; Project awareness/assumption of risk; Safety 
Program monitoring 
C
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Process Improvements 
• Data Requirements and Development 
- Prioritization of safety data requirements to a specific submittal 
phase 
- Develop data matrices 
Consistent format and content defines the standard for 
assessment and expedites compilation of required data 
• Document Submittal 
- Electronic transmittal will eliminate delay in data transfer 
• Variance Approval Process 
- Potential for approval of certain variances to be delegated to the 
SMA Director 
Approval process for Project and ELV Payload Safety Program 
would not change 
• Propose Change to Range Safety Requirements 
- Reduce required delivery date of safety data packages from 45 
days prior to design review, to 30 days.
Mission Success Starts With Safety" 
Implementation Methods 
Example #2: Late submittal of hazardous technical operating 
procedure. 
Considerations: 
Extent of delinquency; frequency 
impact to processing If safety approval is delayed 
Criticality and probability of potential safety risk 
Remedial action required: Compliance (delay performing 
operation), or Variance (level 1) required; Project 
awareness/assumption of risk; Occurrence tracked by 
Payload Safety Program
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Summary 
• Late submittals can have a wide range of Impacts 
- Teuholcel, noel. md .ah.dule l,npoot. to Projed end Safely activitIes 
- Nw.ota can flow to other orgerdoation. and offer ndaaion. 
• Design and safety activities have to be synchronized 
- MIssion engineering ,nllsslon.a are .otmblish.d by projed 
- Safety involv.nwnt and hul need to be timely 
- Safety-related re erner5elclwng.o imposed late how, a ldgher 
likelihood of maior Impact 
• Process changes can provide some improvement 
- Resolution. data pr.paretion end submittal. variance approval, etc.) will 
reqoir. change to cra're,s way of doing business 
- Other fadore..Trairdng? Coanmonication? Staffing? safety mitt..? 
• Alternative (back-up) data sources need to be identified In 
advance, and be utilized when primary sources can not deliver as 
required. 
- Riake noseS be acknowledged by Project Managantere
-; Mission Success Starts With Safety'° 
Proposed NPR 871 5.XX, Chapter 1 
Variance Process 
Consistent with NASA safety variance requirements in NPR 8715.3: 
A variance consists of documented and approved permission 
for relief from an established SMA requirement 
- Exceofion authorizes permanent relief from a specific requIrement 
and may be requested at any time during the project life cycle 
- Devlption authorizes temporary relief in advance from a specific 
requIrement and is requested during the 
formulation/piannlng/design stages 
- Waiver authorIzes temporary relief after the fact from a specific 
requirement and Is requested during the implementation of a 
project or operation to address situatIons that were unforeseen 
during design or planning 
• Each variance type may involve approval of alternative means 
that provide an equivalent or lower level of risk or formal 
acceptance of increased risk Iinxonai.tont with AF Range policy) 
• Approval authorities vary based on the type/level of requirement 
(design/technical, administrative/milestone, HO/local) and on 
whether approval includes acceptance of increased risk 
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
"New" Waiver Process 
• Non-conformance - the state or situation of not 
fulfilling a requirement 
• Waiver , a written authorization allowing relief from 
a requirement (Note: The relief can be temporary) 
• Exception - A written authorization granting 
permanent relief from a specific, non-applicable 
requirement 
• Variance - This term has specific significance in the 
adminIstration of OSHA requirements and will only 
be used in relation to OSHA regulations and 
requirements 
Deviation - encompassed by the terms 
exception and waiver
Mission Success Starts With Safety' 
Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 1 
Variance Process (continued) 
Each Payload Proiect Manager: 
Coordinate with their mission PSWG and the Executive 
Team as soon as the Project identifies a potential 
noncompliance with a safety requirement 
To identify all options for resolving any issues and 
determining if a variance is required 
• Document any safety variance request using the format 
provided in NPR 871 5.XX, Appendix C 
• Submit any draft variance request to their mission PSWG 
and to the Executive Team for review and input 
• Ensure request is coordinated with all concurring and 
approving officials as agreed to by the PSWG and 
Executive Team and the appropriate signatures are 
obtained 
Mission Success Starts With Safety'° 
Proposed NPR 8715.XX, Chapter 1 
Variance Process (continued) 
The PSWG and the Executive Team: 
• Ensure request and accompanying data are correct and 
complete 
• Ensure any residual risk is properly characterized (quantitatively 
or qualitatively and any increase in risk is properly identified 
• Assesa effects on requirements or other ELV payload projects 
and initiate any actions needed to address such effects 
• Ensure request Identifies all needed signatures for approval. 
concurrence, and any risk acceptance 
- NASA and external approval authorities 
- Technical authority (or equivaient) responsible for the requirement 
- center Directors or Other NASA officials responsible for people or 
property exposed to any risk associated with the variance 
• The Chief of OSMA may delegate his approval authority for HO 
level NPR safely variances
Mission Success Starts With Safety 
Training Program 
2 Courses to be developed and offered: 
• ELV Payload Safety Process 
- I - Day process and requirements course for program 
managers and center S&MA managers 
• ELV Payload Safety Analysis 
- A detailed 3 - Day process and analysis course with panel 
and working group exercises for PSWG members
20
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'V Training Program (continued) 
ELV Payload Safety Process - I day course 
• System Safety Requirements Overview 
• Management Roles & Responsibihties 
- Safety Requirements In Contracts 
- Resources (Budgel/Manpower) 
Reviews & Approvals 
- Mission Assurance & Personed Safety 
• ELV Payload Safety Review and Approval Process 
- NPR Chapter 2 Requirements 
- Additional Roles and Responsibilities (PSWG & ethers) 
- Deliverables & Schedule 
- NPR Chapter 3 Paytsad Design and Ground Operations Safety 
Requirements Summary 
- Requirements 
- Fomiat 
- Examples
Wsslon Success Starts With 
Training Program (continued) 
ELV Payload Safety Analysis —3 Day course 
• Payload Mission Life Cycle 
• Roles & Responsibilities 
• Payload System Safety Unique Requirements 
• Compliance Documents 
• Process Requirements 
- Phase reviews 
- Variances 
- Approval/certification 
• Payload Design Requirements 
• Payload Ground Processing Requirements 
• Requirements Verification 
Mission Success Starts WIth Safetyv 
Training Program (continued) 
ELy Payload Safety Analysis - 3 Day course (cont.) 
• Technical Operating Procedures 
• Deliverables 
- Schedule 
- Content 
- Fotms 
• Presentations 
- Phase I, II. Ill Safety Reviews 
- SARR/SMARR 
• Launch Site Protocol 
- Communicabons/coordination 
- Anomaly & mishap reporting 
• Communication Interfaces 
• Issue Resolution 
• Lessons Learned
Mission Success Starts WIth 
• Questions or Comments? 
• Action Items
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